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Constructing New Retirement Systems: 
Choosing between Insurance and Investment, Choice and Default 
 
Abstract 
 
Retirement 20/20 is the Society of Actuaries initiative to find new retirement systems 
(focusing on tier II) that meet the needs of stakeholders better than the existing DB/DC 
models. The first steps in the initiative were to identify characteristics of a successful new 
retirement system, by identifying the needs and risks of stakeholders in the system. What 
has emerged is an understanding of the tension that exists today between investment and 
insurance, choice and default (including how choices are structured). In addition, the 
Retirement 20/20 initiative has constructed a Measurement Framework that can be used 
to analyze how well plan designs meet the needs and risks of stakeholders in the system; 
in the analysis of several plans, we have brought out other features that lead to successful 
retirement systems. This paper summarizes what we’ve learned to date about the balance 
between investment and insurance, choice and default, highlight roles for stakeholders 
and suggest new ways of bringing people together to prepare for their retirement. 
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Constructing New Retirement Systems:  
Choosing between Insurance and Investment, Choice and Default 
 
Introduction 
Retirement 20/20 (R20/20) is a strategic initiative of the Society of Actuaries to develop 
new retirement designs.  R20/20 systematically explores new ideas for retirement systems that go 
beyond the existing defined benefit (DB) or defined contribution (DC) framework.  During the 
20th century, many employers established private pension plans; initially pensions were of the 
DB type.  DB plans are a form of insurance for individuals, paying fixed benefits over a lifetime 
once the individual retires.  Their primary forms of payment have guarantees of amount and 
guarantees to pay as long as, but only as long as, the individual (and potentially the individual’s 
beneficiary) lives.  Covered employees have many guarantees, but few choices.  The last few 
decades of the 20th century saw a decline in the DB plan as private employers moved to DC 
plans.  DC plans promise a fixed contribution which goes into an account which (usually) 
accumulates with investment earnings.  This fund accumulates wealth which can then be used to 
meet retirement needs.  R20/20 seeks to discover new designs that could move beyond the 
DB/DC paradigm.  More details about R20/20, and an overview of the work to date, are found in 
Appendix I.  
R20/20’s analysis has focused on analyzing the needs, risks and roles of stakeholders in 
the system, and exploring key themes that emerged early in the process (e.g. aligning roles with 
skills, inclusion of self-adjusting mechanisms). As R20/20 participants have worked through the 
needs and risks facing the stakeholders in the retirement system, we’ve discovered that there is a 
key tension as to whether private retirement wealth (outside of social insurance) should be in the 
form of insurance or investment wealth.  In addition, another key tension is the degree to which 
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stakeholders, particularly individuals, ought to have choices (e.g. whether their retirement wealth 
is primarily insurance or investment, how much wealth is accumulated, how that wealth is 
converted to income in retirement and whether payment streams are annuitized).  These tensions 
arise because of competing needs and risks of the primary stakeholders: society, individuals, 
employers and markets.   
Individuals.  Individuals’ preferences may vary over their lifecycle, and the presence of 
either a one-size-fits-all DB or DC model may not accommodate such dynamic preferences.  
Individuals are poor at retirement planning and make poor choices, the consequences of which 
(inadequate retirement wealth, outliving retirement assets) are not realized until the individual is 
older and poor outcomes may not be remedied easily. 
Society.  Society (current and future generations of taxpayers) has an interest in 
retirement stability, defined as the greatest number of individuals being able to support 
themselves in retirement with least reliance on social insurance and welfare.  Future taxpayers 
prefer that retirees have as much private wealth accumulated so they do not have to transfer as 
much income directly to retirees in the form of increased social insurance or welfare benefits.  
Society also wants its elderly population to have a certain minimum level of support.  Society 
needs strong defaults, to protect future taxpayers against the negative consequences of bad 
choices made today.   
Employers.  While society has, to date, granted employers the decision as to whether 
employees accumulate retirement wealth as investment or insurance, employers’ choices are 
driven by what best serves their core business operations.   Employers find that employees want 
pension benefits, but are generally indifferent as to the form.  Younger employees were less 
likely to prefer defined benefit plans, although plan preferences vary by employment type1 
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(AAA/SOA 2004).  As such, the employer then focuses on the drawbacks it associates with 
sponsoring insurance (DB) plans (e.g. volatility of contributions and accounting costs, 
assumption of long-term liabilities, administrative costs, and fiduciary risk).  
Markets.  Within R20/20, markets were originally defined as the capital markets within 
which retirement wealth is accumulated and de-accumulated.  While the capital markets are an 
important tool of the system, markets aren’t a stakeholder in the system’s success, per se. Using 
markets wisely, however, through transparency and proper pricing of risk, is key to the success 
of any retirement system.  As such, R20/20 considers markets as a stakeholder in its analysis.   
The Society of Actuaries has also developed a tool to consider how well the needs and 
risks of stakeholders are met by any particular retirement model.  This tool, called the 
Measurement Framework, outlines 34 criteria for the four stakeholders which determine how 
well any particular system meets retirement needs.  The criteria allow a more nuanced evaluation 
of a plan that goes beyond the insurance/investment and choice/default framework.    
To date we’ve analyzed three existing systems that differ from the corporate DB/DC 
model.  From the Measurement Framework we’ve identified other features to consider in 
creating a successful retirement system: strong governance framework, alignment of roles with 
skills, presence of self-adjusting mechanisms (that share risk among stakeholders), solidarity 
among plan participants, use of groups, a degree of independence from employer, and use of 
nearly default free discount rates for measurement.    
What we’ve learned from R20/20 is that we need to consciously balance setting the line 
between investment and insurance, and how we think about choices versus defaults (including 
how we structure choices and set defaults), and how we design systems with the other key 
features . Our understanding of needs, risks and roles of key stakeholders in the system must 
   
4
govern how we design new systems.  What we have today is a system which has been hampered 
by regulation.  What is needed is for the system to evolve to permit new ways of thinking about 
how to achieve this balance.   
Investment vs. Insurance   
One key differentiation is whether the goal of the Tier II retirement system is to insure 
against the economic risks of retirement or accumulate wealth to meet economic needs in 
retirement.  While both of these require the same thing – an accumulation of wealth during the 
working years – they are very different in terms of what guarantees they bring, what choice (or 
lack thereof) they offer, how they use the markets, and how they accommodate individual 
situations.   Stakeholders in the retirement system have different points of view as to whether 
wealth or insurance is the key need.  
Society focuses on ensuring that most individuals have sufficient retirement security.  
Generations with (overall) inadequate retirement income will increase pressure to raise social 
insurance benefits, increasing the direct transfer of wealth from workers to retirees.   Society is 
also at risk with greater variation in the level of retirement income; to the extent that the 
dispersion of private wealth increases (more people reach retirement with less than adequate or 
more than adequate income) society faces unpleasant choices.  Individuals with less than 
adequate income may press for an overall increase in social insurance benefits or may draw more 
welfare benefits.  Government can finance these benefits by increasing taxes on retirees with 
more wealth, but this is complicated and politically dangerous (objections might be raised both 
from retirees, who see their wealth at stake, and workers, who see their potential future wealth at 
stake). 
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R20/20 participants noted that while society favors insurance, it favors a degree of 
insurance such that individuals’ needs are met and future taxpayers are not burdened by 
excessive cost or risk.  The consensus is that a degree of annuitization is important, and it may be 
important for society to mandate or encourage (e.g. through tax policy) annuitization in addition 
to what Social Security provides.  This conclusion that a degree of, but not necessarily full, 
annuitization is valuable is supported by other research (Dushi and Webb, 2004).    
Insurance arrangements do a better job of meeting the retirement needs and risk 
preferences of individuals.  The Measurement Framework includes eleven individual criteria, six 
of which are met by insurance forms of payment (guaranteed income, predictability of income, 
sensitive to family needs, requirement for individual skills, investment risk, and longevity risk).  
Three others (sensitivity to employment conditions, inflation risk and premature retirement risk) 
can be met by either insurance or wealth measures.  Only two (retirement flexibility and 
portability) are difficult to meet within the existing insurance structures (although insurance 
structures could be redesigned better to meet those needs).   The individual criteria are discussed 
further in the section on the Measurement Framework. 
Individual preferences for investment type vehicles, particularly while they are younger, 
may reflect the preference for portability and for flexibility in timing and manner of retirement 
distributions.  Portability has been seen as a strong feature in the DC system, even though that 
portability has been shown to create leakage (retirement assets being cashed out on job transfer) 
(Munnell and Sundén, 2006).  Knowledge workers in particular are phasing into retirement, often 
by combining work with retirement as they reach their 50s and 60s (sometimes by choice and 
sometimes due to labor market conditions or a need to care for parents/spouse).  One challenge 
for future insurance models is to accommodate better portability and flexibility of payment.    
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Portability is perceived to be important while individuals are many years from retirement.  
Portability is more important among younger workers and younger retirees than older workers or 
older retirees (AAA/SOA 2004).  Retirees have stronger preference than workers for guaranteed 
income streams, regardless of whether they are through a defined benefit or defined contribution 
arrangement (AAA/SOA 2004).   
While individuals need insurance protection, there are several factors which keep 
individuals from voluntarily seeking it.  Individuals prefer to maintain levels of wealth as a 
cushion against health shocks, including the potential need for care (in home or institutional) as 
individuals age; individuals also prefer wealth for bequest motives (Ameriks et al, 2008).  
Finally, individuals tend to underestimate their own life expectancy (Society of Actuaries, 2005).    
Annuitization can have other benefits; individuals with more of their wealth annuitized tend to 
consume less than individuals with less of their wealth committed to lifetime income (Butrica 
and Mermin, 2006) which may mean that annuitization can help individuals with less wealth 
manage that wealth better through retirement.    Focus group participants only considered a few 
years ahead in their planning horizon (possibly decreasing the value they saw in annuitization); 
they also, however, reported deciding whether they could afford to retire by comparing monthly 
expenses with monthly income (Greenwald et al 2006).  
If we consider the view of the markets or of employers on whether benefits take the form 
of investment or insurance, these stakeholders are indifferent.  As noted earlier, employers 
generally prefer sponsoring plans DC (investment) plans rather than DB (insurance) plans, but 
this is because of the risk that sponsorship places on employers.  If we consider the needs of 
employers (managing workforce, supporting primary business purpose, responsive to owners) 
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and risks they face (business risk, regulatory risk, fiduciary risk and litigation risk), in theory, 
there should be no preference for an insurance or investment model.  
Traditionally, DB plans (insurance) have been valued by employers for their ability to 
attract, retain and retire workers effectively.  However, for many employers, these features have 
been overshadowed by the associated risk associated with DB plan sponsorship.  If an employer 
wants an insurance vehicle (DB plan), the employer essentially establishes a captive annuity 
writer.  Shareholders (business owners) may prefer that managers not take risk outside the core 
business.  In addition, the employer (as plan sponsor) must meet complex funding and 
accounting rules, and operational requirements for everything from notices on benefit payment to 
restrictions on payments to highly compensated employees.  The investment model has been 
friendlier to the manager: the manager retains the ability to adjust contributions, cash cost equals 
accounting cost, and there is no balance sheet impact; the investment model presents less risk to 
company operations.  If the employer’s role did not require it to sponsor the investment or 
insurance arrangement, the employer should be indifferent between the models (and might prefer 
insurance models if they provide an advantage in attraction, retention and retirement).   
From the markets’ point of view, retirement assets are invested in the markets whether 
they are in an investment or insurance form.  Today, we associate the insurance form with 
insurers, who invest primarily in risk-free assets.  DB plans, however, invest in both risk-free and 
risky assets (equities), and the typical lifecycle DC fund holds some portion of investments in 
risky assets.  There is a debate that retirement systems operate more efficiently by investing in 
risky assets, because the long horizon of the typical DB plan allows investors to ride through 
market declines (cite); similarly lifecycle theory states that individuals can invest in risky assets 
because when participants are younger, they have more tolerance for risk (cite) (and they can 
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weather market downturns).  Others have argued to the contrary; that over the long time horizon 
equities become more risky (Bodie, 1995).   R20/20 participants have not settled on whether 
retirement systems should invest savings (in the investment or insurance form) in only risk-free 
assets or risk-free and risky assets; the choice of market investments is part of the construction of 
models.   
Market Innovation and the Cost of Insurance.   One theme that has emerged from R20/20 
is how to use the markets better in insurance arrangements: do we have the right market 
instruments to drive down the cost of insurance arrangements?   
In the 20th century, many individuals derived their non-Social Security income through 
employer sponsored DB plans.  While these plans were never universal, they provide a 
significant source of retirement income, particularly at the middle and upper income tiers (Reno 
and Lavery, 2007).   Plan sponsors have hedged many risks of retirement, including investment 
returns and cohort mortality risk2, by charging current or future shareholders (corporate plans) or 
taxpayers (public plans) the cost of any losses.  
If the system is to change, and we are to move away from the employer (as sponsor) 
guarantee yet retain the insurance guarantee within the plan, then more hedging may be required.  
(Self-adjusting mechanisms are one way to allow the plan to continue to take investment risk by 
sharing that risk with participants; these mechanisms are discussed in the Measurement 
Framework section.)   
One question that has emerged is whether such hedging requires new market instruments.  
Can we design new retirement systems if these instruments are not yet available?  The 
conclusion has been that we probably have to design the system first and go to the market to 
demand the new instruments.  And, in turn, there has to be sufficient demand (e.g. higher levels 
   
9
of annuitization than seen today) for the market to be able to create the hedging instruments.  If 
you consider the chicken-and-egg dilemma of creating the market instruments first to encourage 
the insurance instruments or creating the insurance instruments (with strong demand) and then 
asking the markets to respond with hedging instruments, it is the latter path that R20/20 
participants believe will be successful.  The market can only react to strong, well-defined 
institutional demand.  Creating more demand for annuities will allow us to bring the price down 
by creating the demand for hedging instruments to spread the risk of annuitization to the wider 
capital markets.   In reality there may be a ratcheting effect (demand for annuities creates 
demand for instruments which creates more insurance products).   
Choice vs. Default   
The issue of choice covers several concepts: the degree of choice within the system, how 
choices are framed, whether certain choices are encouraged or discouraged (through framing or 
other incentives) and who pays the penalty if bad choices are made.  To the extent there are no 
choices, what is the default?  And within a choice scenario, how is the default selected?  Any 
system with choice requires strong defaults; retirement systems with choice function better with 
strong defaults (Choi et al. 2005).   
Choice is costly.  The lowest-cost risk-pooling option is to gather a large number of 
people and give them the exact same benefit.   The pool benefits from no anti-selection (people 
electing to be or not be in the pool based on their individual understanding of their risk) and 
similarity of benefits drives down administrative cost.  In the purest example of choice between 
cost and wealth – the private annuity market – we find that the cost of private market annuity 
sales to individuals is higher due to anti-selection on the part of the consumer (Finkelstein and 
Poterba 2002).  
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Society is mostly indifferent between choice and default, but, where choice produces bad 
outcomes for society, or where choice increases the cost of the system (taking money away from 
other social goals), society may prefer defaults.  And similarly, to the extent that choice produces 
increased disparity in wealth levels, implying likely rebalancing through unpopular taxation, 
some level of default may be preferred.  Society may prefer to structure choices, through tax 
incentives or penalties, to ensure future taxpayers are defended against bad choices.    
Individuals say they want choice (all other things being equal), as noted earlier in the 
investment section, they often cannot use that choice effectively.  Studies on 401(k) plans have 
shown that left to their own actions, even with good education, participants don’t always act in 
their own best interests (Karlsson, Massa, and Simonov 2007; Choi et al. 2005). The retirement 
planning process is psychologically uncomfortable because it is a reminder of pending decline 
and future death (Weber 2004).  Structured choices and strong defaults help individuals make 
better choices, and keep individuals from having to make uncomfortable decisions.  The extent to 
which choices are offered, incentivized or penalized depends on how the system weighs the 
desire of individuals for choice against the needs of society.  
Retirement Signals.  R20/20 participants have discussed retirement signals, particularly 
signals sent regarding retirement age and the retirement process.  One of the first themes to 
emerge out of R20/20 was support for new norms for work and retirement:  changing retirement 
from an event to a process, and eliminating the idea of the “right” age at which everyone ought 
to retire.  Some R20/20 participants focused on removing existing signals that encourage early 
retirement.  Other participants expressed concerns that not all workers could work to later 
retirement ages.  The consensus that emerged was that new retirement systems ought to be 
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neutral regarding retirement ages, and to set up systems that allow workers to treat retirement as 
a process, rather than an event.   
At our most recent R20/20 conference, attendees discussed how retirement age within 
social insurance (Social Security in the US), serves as an important signal.  Participants also 
discussed how Social Security benefits are presented.  For example, if choices between early and 
normal retirement are presented with a break-even age, this presentation tilts participants to take 
early retirement.  If benefits are shown based on the increased monthly payments at later 
retirement ages, this could tilt participants toward taking later retirement.  The choice of how to 
retire, (all at once or in stages), and when, is a choice that must be framed.  If the tier II 
retirement system does not send any signals for retirement age (it is retirement age neutral) 
participants will find signals from other sources.  The most likely source will be the social 
insurance system.  R20/20 participants continue to consider how retirement age signals should be 
designed. . 
Employers are largely indifferent to the degree of choice individuals have within the 
system. However, employers are not indifferent to their own choices.    Employer choice within 
the retirement system today is very limited: most private employers can choose only to sponsor a 
single-employer DB or a single-employer DC plan.  Sponsorship of a plan (even a DC plan) 
brings a host of regulatory, legal and fiduciary risks.  Most private employers who do not 
sponsor a plan are unable to offer retirement benefits to their employees.  Employers with 
unionized employees can choose to have those employees belong to a multi-employer plan, but 
those plans bring risk to employers as well (exiting from a multi-employer plan can be 
expensive).    
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R20/20 has focused on providing a wide range of options for the employer’s role.  
Choices need to be included to allow employers to have a role in education, in offering 
employees access to a plan or to a range of third-party plans, in providing funding toward third-
party plans, or in sponsoring and funding their own plan.  Adding more opportunities for 
employers to provide access to benefits (without having to sponsor plans) could lead to higher 
coverage in plans by individuals.  In addition, employers may agree to partially fund benefits 
(defer compensation) is they can do so without facing the fiduciary, administrative and 
regulatory risk of plan sponsorship. The cost of entry into the system would be lowered, which 
could increase coverage of individuals.  
University and other select not-for-profit employers, for example, can elect to provide 
access and funding to the TIAA-CREF plan without bearing administrative costs, fiduciary risk 
or investment risk.  From the employer’s standpoint, TIAA-CREF acts like a DC plan: once the 
contribution has been paid, the plan is fully responsible for the benefits.  From the participant’s 
standpoint, the TIAA annuity acts like a variable annuity; while annuity payments vary based on 
fund performance, the annuity provides protection against outliving assets.3  
In the Netherlands, there are industry wide plans, often organized by union or industry, 
where the employers participate in the fund but bear no responsibility for the fund operation.   
The plans are structured a bit differently in that future contribution levels can vary based on fund 
performance, but there are mechanisms to modify retirement benefits as well.  R20/20 
participants suggest that other employers could be given the option to participate in similar plans, 
where the employer’s responsibility ends once the contribution for that year’s benefit has been 
made.   Third party non-employer plan sponsors are discussed in the Measurement Framework 
section. 
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Choice, to markets, represents innovation.  To the degree that all benefits are 
standardized and mandated, markets are unable to respond and innovate.  When R20/20 
participants discussed how markets look at default options, they focused on a need for a balance 
between innovation and standardization.   
There may need to be some degree of standardization, for example of simple annuity 
products (life annuities and deferred life annuities, aka longevity insurance), to give individuals 
clear and comparable choices among annuity providers.  A  degree of standardization helps 
consumers understand the benefits and compare price and quality between insurers for these 
standardized products.  Introduction of standardized products should also decrease cost, by 
making price comparisons easier (driving competition), but also by increasing market share 
(consumers may look first to standardized products, and may be more willing to purchase if they 
understand product differences).  One benefit of increasing market share would be to drive down 
the anti-selection, which would greatly reduce cost; the closer the market can come to a 
compulsory market, the lower the cost to annuitants.  A study of the UK annuity market showed 
that compulsory annuities were considerably less expensive than voluntary annuities, with the 
difference driven largely by anti-selection in the voluntary market (Finkelstein and Poterba, 
2002).  The increased market share could then further drive down cost by driving demand for 
market based hedges for insurers and others issuing the products.   
R20/20 participants recognized that too much standardization drives out innovation; 
insurers and other financial service companies should continue to be able to develop innovative 
insurance and investment products.  Many wealthy retirees use existing annuity products to 
structure income, protect against adverse consequences and satisfy bequest needs.  Continued 
innovation in the annuity market can also benefit retirees with lower levels of wealth, as products 
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that were designed for the wealthy, for example, may find a market among less wealthy 
consumers.  Retirement 20/20 participants believe market innovation is one key to the success of 
the retirement system.  
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Measurement Framework    
SOA volunteers and staff have developed the Measurement Framework (SOA 2009a, 
forthcoming) as a way of evaluating new retirement systems.  The Measurement Framework 
takes the point of view of the four stakeholders and considers for each stakeholder what criteria 
they consider key in a retirement system.  It develops a simple rating of how well the design 
being analyzed meets each criterion, and considers how well it meets it in the presence of moral 
hazard.  It also separately tests four new concepts that bridge stakeholders: self-adjusting 
mechanisms, new norms for work and retirement, aligning roles with skills and alignment with 
markets.  A complete description of the Measurement Framework tool is found in Appendix II.    
The Measurement Framework was developed to help us understand what retirement 
system design features best met the needs of stakeholders within the system.  It allows a 
systematic comparison of new designs.  The stakeholder criteria are provided in Tables I-IV.  .  
Five plans have been evaluated in the Measurement Framework:  single-employer 
corporate final pay DB, single-employer corporate DC (401(k)), Ontario Teachers Pension Plan 
(OTPP), Dutch industry wide schemes, and the Clergy Retirement Security Program (DB) of the 
United Methodist Church (UMC plan) (which was chosen as an example of a church plan).  The 
latter three plans will be collectively referred to as “non-traditional plans” because they fall 
outside the corporate sponsored DB/DC framework.  The non-traditional plans all provide 
participants a DB type benefit, but otherwise differ in terms of how risk and responsibility is 
shared.  A brief description of each plan is found in Appendix III.   We have studied them as case 
studies for other ways of operating a retirement system.4  The preliminary analysis of these non-
traditional plans have highlighted some principles for successful retirement design: strong 
governance framework, alignment of roles with skills, presence of self-adjusting mechanisms 
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(that share risk among stakeholders), solidarity among plan participants, a degree of 
independence from employer, use of groups, and use of nearly default free discount rates for 
measurement.  Some of these principles (strong governance) are well-understood and some are 
still being evaluated (self-adjusting mechanisms) for their potential usefulness.   And, some of 
these principles may not be usable outside of the non-traditional plan.  
Strong Governance.  Plans with robust, transparent, and well-understood governance 
structures work well.  Each of the non-traditional designs has a degree of independence from the 
organizations that fund the plans; partly because of this degree of independence they have a 
robust governance structure to ensure the plan functions properly.  Key features for these non-
traditional plans include: 
 Independent boards made up, in whole or in part, of retirement and investment experts.  The 
OTPP Board has eight members plus a chair, all of whom are retirement professionals (the 
Ontario Teacher’s Federation may appoint one teacher to the Board).  
 Board members may be chosen by employers or employees but they do not act as 
representatives of the employer or employee.  Typically they have professional experience 
in pensions and investments.    
 Plans have pre-set rules about how to change contributions or benefit levels (some plans 
have pre- or post-retirement inflation indexation).  The Dutch industry wide plans have a 
“policy ladder” which predetermines how contributions and benefit indexation are affected 
by funding levels in the plan.   
 The Board sets the contribution rates and those funding the plan must pay their share of the 
cost; contribution rates are not negotiable.  
 The Board sets benefit levels that are common for all members.   
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 Where members are union members, benefits are not subject to negotiation (benefit levels 
are set by the Board, on which the union has representation). 
Strong governance implies a strong role for society (government) in its role as regulator.  
Note that strong governance does not require strong government regulation; in some cases the 
plans with strong governance exist because there is less government regulation upon the plan 
and the plan sponsor has taken the responsibility to ensure that its own governance structure is 
strong.  One could argue that too many rules and regulations create a situation where the plan is 
so busy “following the rules” that it cannot focus on proper governance.  Successful retirement 
systems need strong governance, particularly if these systems are not sponsored by a single 
employer for a single employee group.   
Alignment of Roles with Skill.  Within the Measurement Framework tool, plans that 
allocate roles away from individuals and employers, in particular, score better.  Key features for 
these non-traditional plans include:  
 Use of professional investment advisors to make investment decisions (individuals do not 
make investment choices). 
 Independence from the employers of the plan participants.  In particular, the plans have an 
independent board, comprised mostly, if not solely, with retirement and investment 
professionals who act on behalf of the plan, rather than the plan sponsor (cutting 
contributions to meet budget needs) or plan participants (raising benefits, particularly in 
unionized situations).   
 Establishment of an independent board with full authority to levy contributions from 
participants and their employers.   
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 Offering limited choices to participants structured around traditional annuities (these plans 
do not offer lump sums except small amounts at termination).    
Presence of self-adjusting mechanisms.  Self-adjusting mechanisms permit the plan to 
adjust benefits (including benefits paid to retirees) and contributions based on plan experience.  
These mechanisms can also be seen as risk sharing mechanisms.   One criticism of the DB and 
DC plans is that by focusing solely on the insurance or investment model, they put all risk to 
one party (employer sponsors for DB, participant for DC) and none to the other (participant for 
DB, employer sponsor for DC).  A more robust system would share risks.  This however 
requires a new way of thinking about the promise of the benefit that would permit changes in 
benefit amounts.  Examples of self adjusting mechanisms in these non-traditional plans include:  
 The Dutch industry wide plan formulae are generally career-pay based benefits.  Benefits 
are indexed pre-retirement and post-retirement with inflation.  However, both pre- and post-
retirement indexation is conditional on plan performance.  In this case, if the plan has 
negative experience, not only do contributions increase, but expected inflationary increases 
can be foregone.   
 The OTPP has recently introduced conditional inflation indexing for its retirees.  This will 
take twenty years to phase in fully, but eventually, post-retirement indexation for retirees 
will also be conditional on fund performance. 
The idea of self-adjusting mechanisms is they allow the plan to continue to take risk 
(particularly investment risk); if equities outperform risk-free assets, the participants are able to 
earn higher benefits for lower contributions.   Self-adjusting mechanisms are often designed 
using ALM models and Monte Carlo type scenarios of market performance given a typical asset 
mix.  Models by definition are limited, and the 2008/2009 liquidity crisis is just one example of 
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how market events can be more devastating than what can be predicted by typical capital market 
scenarios.  Moreover, steep declines in markets can lead to less available cash for pension 
funding and higher unemployment, leading to more forced early retirement.  These cascading 
scenarios are outside the ability of computer models to handle.  Third parties report that De 
Nederlandsche Bank has recently acknowledged that existing risk management instruments in 
the Dutch industry-wide plans are less effective than originally thought (Preesman, 18 March 
2009).  If self-adjusting mechanisms are not sufficiently robust to withstand market corrections, 
they may not represent strong retirement design feature.  
We are also not sure that self-adjusting mechanisms within an industry collective plan 
could withstand the decline of that industry (e.g. steel manufacturing in the US).  As an industry 
declines, and more workers are forced into retirement, there would be less money available for 
cash contributions, more retirees in the fund (than active workers) and possibly more workers 
entering retirement sooner than might have been predicted.  These plans would at the very least 
have to shift their expectations over time to focus more on lower levels of securitized benefits 
and may be able to take fewer risks than when originally designed.   
Finally, there are fundamental economic questions as to whether it is better to hedge 
these risks in the market rather than share them with plan participants.  The erosion of 
purchasing power through inflation can erode the insurance protections of retirement benefits, 
suggesting that this risk ought not to be subject to adjustments for plan performance.  
At the 2008 R20/20 conference, participants raised concerns that the willingness of 
employed participants to take on risk may be very different than the willingness of retirees to 
take on those same risks; it may be better if these funds are bifurcated so that retiree benefits 
(and the benefits of those approaching retirement) are securitized while benefits for working 
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employees might be subject to more investment risk.  This may lower the eventual benefits that 
can be provided, but would provide greater security and better risk management..    
Solidarity among members.  These non-traditional plans have strong solidarity among 
members, as evidenced by the following features: 
 Both the OTPP and UMC plans are organized around a particular profession (teachers and 
clergy, respectively).  All members of the profession within a large geographic area (Ontario 
and the US, respectively) are automatically in the plan, and if they change employers (within 
that profession/geographic area) they remain members of the plan.   The organization can 
also be by union groups. 
 Plans may require significant employee contributions.  The OTPP requires employees to 
contribute half of cost of the plan annually (the other half is contributed mostly by the 
Government of Ontario with minor contributions from other employers in the system).  For 
2009, employee contributions are 10.4% up to the Canadian Pension Plan (CPP) Maximum 
Pensionable Earnings limit ($CN 46,300) and 12.0% over the CPP limit; employer 
contributions are equal to employee contributions (OTPP 2008). 
 Plans adjust contributions or benefits based on fund performance.  Adjusting benefits and 
contributions for members ties members into the performance of the fund, and gives 
members a share in the stake of how well the plan is managed (as opposed to having a third 
party – the employer – be solely responsible for plan management). 
One concern about the effectiveness of solidarity is the extent to which demographic 
shifts (plan population aging) can affect the ability of the plan to maintain solidarity.  As noted 
earlier, plans with an aging membership or in a declining industry may have difficulty 
maintaining solidarity among plan members.  Solidarity may also be tested by extreme 
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conditions; the Dutch industry wide plans are starting to see strains in solidarity, with unions 
insisting benefits cannot be significantly reduced (Preesman 16 February 2009) and retiree 
organizations calling for a rescue fund for retirees (Preesman 13 March 2009).  These non-
traditional plans also have high natural internal cohesiveness among participants (teachers 
within a union, clergy within a denomination, and Dutch citizens (within a particularly industry 
or union)); it is not known to what extent the internal cohesiveness must already exist to get the 
benefits from solidarity.   
A degree of independence from the employer.   These non-traditional plans have a 
sponsor who is not the individual employer who is funding the plan.  The OTPP is jointly 
sponsored by the Ontario Ministry of Education and the Ontario Teacher’s Federation, making it 
separate from the independent school boards that employ the teachers covered by the plan.  The 
Dutch industry wide schemes are independent of the employers whose employees participate in 
the plan.   The UMC plan is sponsored by the United Methodist Church and not by the 
individual parishes.  
US multi-employer plans are not sponsored by a single employer, but rather by a group 
of employers on behalf of their unionized workforce (generally members of specific unions).  
Multi-employer plans work differently than these non-traditional plans because the participating 
employers remain responsible for plan underfunding; an employer that wishes to leave the plan 
must pay a one-time charge for any underfunding at the time of the plan withdrawal (GAO 
2004).  The employers are interdependent on each other for the economic health for the health 
of the plan (GAO 2004), which may make an employer reluctant to be the “last large employer 
standing” in a weak (underfunded) multi-employer plan.   
   
22
In these non-traditional plans, the employers are, not strictly speaking, responsible for 
any plan underfunding (although they will likely be charged higher contribution rates should the 
plan become underfunded).  While some may argue this is a weak distinction, we have seen that 
these non-traditional plans also have stronger governance models and self-adjusting 
mechanisms that adjust both contributions and benefits.  
Use of groups.  All teachers in Ontario participate in the OTPP, all ministers in the 
United Methodist Church participate in the UMC plan, and the Dutch industry wide plans are 
typically organized by industry or profession (and cover many or all workers in that industry or 
profession the Netherlands).  Participants at the 2007 R20/20 conference, which focused on 
aligning roles with skills, concluded that having individuals participate in large groups was one 
way to reduce the information asymmetry between individuals and markets (individuals who 
don’t have expertise in the markets can hire someone who does have market expertise).   In 
addition, it provides for lower administrative and investment fees (than individual account plans 
or smaller pension plans), improved coverage (all employers are in the system) and perfectly 
portable benefits (to the extent participants stay within the profession/geographic area).  This is 
in addition to the benefits of pooling of mortality risk.  
Nearly default-free discount rates.  Several of these non-traditional plans use discount 
rates that are nearly default-free to measure actuarial funded status.  For example, in its 2007 
valuation the OTPP presents accrued benefits measured with a of 4.65% discount rate, which is 
the rate as of January 1, 2007 on long-term Government of Canada real-return bonds plus 50 
basis points to reflect the credit risk for the Province of Ontario (OTPP 2008).  The Dutch 
industry wide plans measure accrued benefits5 on a fair value basis (using default-free rates) 
(Ponds and van Riel, 2007).   
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Conclusion   
The balance between insurance and investment, choice and default, has been tipping 
slowly, based on the preferences of employers, for whom the investment/choice model presents 
less risk to the business.  Individuals have certainly pushed employers in this direction, as the last 
two decades of the 20th century saw increasing demand by baby boomers for DC plans, which 
coincided with strong equity markets that made DC plans appear to be secure vehicles for 
retirement wealth.  But is this push for investment over insurance is healthy for the retirement 
system as a whole: are the needs of future generations met by having so many individuals create 
investment wealth rather than longevity insurance?  Both individuals and society have need for 
insurance protection; society also faces additional risks if individuals make poor choices.   
Employers have played a central role in the system, but the primacy of that role is an 
accident of history.  Many employers are no longer interested or able to sponsor plans that play 
the insurance role; the risk these systems pose to employers, long-term, do not permit them to 
sponsor a DB plan.  The DC plan is better suited to the employers’ risk needs.  But, the DC plan 
is not as well suited to the insurance needs of individuals or society.  One potential solution is to 
take sponsorship of retirement plans that provide insurance type benefits out of the hands of 
employers and give them to third parties. 
Markets work best when well trained agents approach the markets.  Financial markets are 
complex; individuals cannot be expected to understand market complexities, and even 
individuals with sophisticated knowledge may not want to spend the time making sophisticated 
choices.  Retirement systems work well that utilize markets without requiring great individual 
knowledge or time. 
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Our challenge is to design new systems that work on the axes of investment/insurance 
and default/choice.  A certain degree of default/insurance protection must be provided, to meet 
society’s and individual’s needs and risks.  Any system must be designed with the proper use of 
markets in mind.  Moving this design solely out of the employer based system will open up the 
possibilities for new creative designs that break out of the DB/DC paradigm.   
The Measurement Framework was designed to help us analyze how well particular 
retirement designs work in meeting the needs, risks and roles identified in the R20/20 process.  
In looking at the traditional DB and DC system, and focusing on three case studies that are 
outside this paradigm (OTPP, UMC plan and Dutch industry wide funds) we have highlighted 
other features that make these non-traditional designs succeed: strong governance, solidarity 
among plan participants, alignment of roles with skills, inclusion of self-adjusting mechanisms, 
degree of independence from employers, using the power of groups, and measuring liabilities 
using nearly default-free rates.  While we have concerns that these designs can sustain significant 
demographic, investment or industry shocks, these features may inspire us toward better 
retirement systems.   
Finally, we cannot forget that the retirement income system does not operate in a 
vacuum.  Individuals (particularly in the US) face challenges in meeting their health and long-
term care needs as well, challenges that can keep them from making the right choices regarding 
retirement income.   Participants at the first R20/20 conference recognized this and listed needed 
improvements in the financing of health and long-term care as key if new retirement systems are 
to succeed.  Considering changes to the health and long-term care systems are outside the scope 
off the R20/20 project, but, more critically, health and long-term care for retirees must be 
considered within the context of the larger health care system in the US.  
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Appendix I –Retirement 20/20 Overview  
Retirement 20/20 is an initiative of the Society of Actuaries’ Pension Section Council to 
develop new retirement systems that extend beyond the existing DB/DC paradigm.  Initial work 
on the initiative began in late 2005.  R20/20 has brought actuaries together with attorneys, 
economists, employers and other public policy experts from the US and Canada to systematically 
explore the fundamental characteristics of a new retirement system.  When the initiative started, 
it was broadly focused to consider the role of social insurance, employer vehicles (Tier II) and 
private savings. As it has evolved, it has focused on new vehicles for Tier II.  Over three 
conferences participants have discussed the role of social insurance, and whether that needed to 
change.  Participants have reaffirmed the design of existing social insurance systems in the US 
and Canada as the base upon which to build new Tier II designs.   
The first conference was in September 2006, with the goal to understand the 
fundamentals needed for a successful 21st century retirement system.  It introduced the four 
stakeholders (society, individual, employers and markets) and asked three questions for each 
stakeholder: 
 Who has what needs? 
 Who bears what risks? 
 Who should or could play what roles?  
For purposes of the conference (and future conferences) stakeholders were defined as 
follows: 
 Society is society as a whole (all taxpayers and citizens).  It includes current and future 
generations.  Future generations have a stake in the success of the retirement system, because 
if the system is not successful, they may have to pay higher taxes (transfer more of their 
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income) to retirees.  In this framework, government (politicians) is an agent acting on behalf 
of taxpayers and citizens (including future generations).  
 Individuals are the retirement unit: the persons who will be relying on the retirement system 
for income during retirement.  They face various risks in retirement and need to find ways to 
hedge, pool, or bear those risks in retirement.  
 Markets have two roles.  First, it is the market where wealth is accumulated and de-
accumulated.  Markets also provide opportunities to hedge and pool retirement risks.  
Markets include capital markets and insurers and other financial services firms that offer 
retirement income or wealth vehicles. 
 Employers have needs to attract, retain, motivate and eventually to retire individuals. 
The 2006 conference report (SOA 2007) outlines the conference findings around needs, 
risks and roles for the four stakeholders.  Much of the findings from that conference were used in 
development of the Measurement Framework.  In addition to the specific findings on needs, risks 
and roles, six themes emerged from the conference: 
 Systems should align stakeholders’ roles with their skills 
 Systems should be designed to self-adjust 
 Systems should consider new norms for work and retirement and the role of the normative 
retirement age. 
 Systems should be better aligned with markets. 
 Systems should clarify the role of the employer 
 Retirement systems will not succeed without improvements in the health and long-term care 
systems. 
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These themes emerged in discussions that crossed stakeholders, and were seen as 
overarching themes that met the needs, risks and role of all stakeholders.  The R20/20 initiative 
has focused on retirement income; conference reports have noted the importance of 
improvements in health and long-term care, but have not specifically addressed these, as they are 
outside the scope of the initiative.   
The 2007 conference focused on aligning roles with skills for society, employers and 
markets.  The conference focused on these three stakeholders who support individuals; if the 
roles of these supporting stakeholders are aligned, individuals should be better off. The 2007 
conference focused on these questions around role definition: 
 Which stakeholder is best suited to take on what role? 
 How do you allocate roles based on stakeholder skills? 
 How do these role assignments affect other stakeholders? 
The 2007 conference report outlines detailed findings (SOA 2008).  Conference 
participants focused on the role of society to provide structure in the system, through consumer 
protection, helping individuals make better decisions, and setting guidelines about what ought to 
happen.  They concluded that society should work toward goals which include some degree of 
annuitization (guaranteed lifetime income), helping individuals accumulate retirement wealth 
and providing oversight to the system.  
Markets were seen to function most efficiently when groups approached the markets, 
when well trained agents were properly incentivized, and when some market product offerings 
were standardized, but not to the extent that innovation was hampered (conference participants 
believed it was important to encourage innovation in hedging and pooling instruments).   
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Finally, employers were best utilized if they could play a number of roles within the 
system, not just the role of plan sponsor. Opening up the employer role to roles of facilitator 
(helping individuals accumulate wealth), educator or trusted advisor, and possible additional 
elective roles as purchasing agent, distributor of retirement income and guarantor (similar to the 
employer role in the defined benefit system).    Opening up the possibilities of the employer role 
was seen as critically important.   
The 2008 conference focused on several themes that emerged over prior conferences 
 Changing signals,  
 Default distribution options,  
 Self-adjusting mechanisms, and 
 Market hedging opportunities. 
Regarding changing signals, conference participants focused on signals sent within social 
insurance (Social Security) regarding retirement ages.    
Much of the discussion of default distributions focused on why individuals do not 
annuitize, with conference participants reaffirming the need for a minimum level of 
annuitization.   
The Dutch industry wide design were featured in the discussion on self-adjusting 
mechanisms; conference participants focused on the strengths and weaknesses of self-adjusting 
mechanisms (including whether all participants had the same desire for risk). 
Finally, the question of whether market hedges needed to be introduced before new 
retirement systems could be designed was discussed; panelists concluded that market demand 
would be necessary to drive the introduction of new hedging instruments (e.g. longevity bonds 
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that hedge against systematic mortality improvements).  More detail can be found in the 2008 
conference report (SOA 2009b, forthcoming).   
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Appendix II – About the Measurement Framework  
The Measurement Framework was developed as a tool to test how well new designs met 
the principles for new retirement systems that were being developed within R20/20.  The tool 
was to test whether the design aspects met, or appeared to meet, the needs and risks for each 
stakeholder, and whether they were best suited to the role identified for that stakeholder.  In 
addition they looked at four of the cross-stakeholder themes from the 2006 conference: self-
adjusting (automatically adjust to changing demographic and economic conditions), align roles 
with skills, support new norms for work and retirement, and align with markets.   
The framework assesses 34 characteristics for each of the four stakeholders: society (9 
characteristics), individuals (11 characteristics), employers (8 characteristics) and markets (6 
characteristics).  Tables I-IV shows the characteristics and their definitions.   
Each characteristic, or criterion, is assigned a rating on a red-yellow-green scale.  There 
are five color choices:  green, yellow-green, yellow, yellow-red and red.  The green rating is 
highest, suggesting that the plan does as well as can be expected in meeting that need or risk, 
while a red rating suggests the plan does extremely poorly in meeting that need or risk.  The 
ratings are assessed by a team of retirement professionals (actuaries and others) with expertise in 
retirement systems.  
The ratings for stakeholders are combined to create a composite rating.  The composite 
rating can blur differences (a plan with a lot of red and a lot of green can score yellow in the 
composite rating, as can a plan with a lot of yellow ratings), so the Framework shows color bars 
together with the summary rating to show the degree of variation in the ratings across all needs 
and risks for that stakeholder.   
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In addition to baseline ratings, each characteristic is rated based on the effect of moral 
hazard.  We recognize that a plan can be designed with one intention, but the actions of agents or 
misunderstandings of stakeholders can lead to different (negative) outcomes.  For example, plans 
that pay benefits in the form of annuities score highly for individuals along the “guaranteed 
income” criteria; the presence of a lump sum option represents a moral hazard for the individual, 
which would lower that score.  Each category shows scores for both the individual characteristic 
and that characteristic considering moral hazard.    
Figures I and II show a sample page for Individuals with ratings for four characteristics 
(guaranteed income, predictability of income, retirement flexibility and portability) for a 
traditional single-employer DB and single-employer DC plan, respectively.  Figure III shows the 
sample summary chart for individuals for a defined benefit plan, with ratings annotated.   
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Appendix III – Summary of Non-traditional Plans 
Ontario Teachers Pension Plan (OTPP).  OTPP covers all non-university teachers, in 
public and certain private schools, and those who work in certain teaching related organizations 
in the province of Ontario.  As of 31 December 2007 the plan had $CN 108.5 billion in assets 
and $CN 115.4 in liabilities (on an accrued benefits basis) (OTPP 2008).   The plan is jointly 
sponsored by the Ontario Ministry of Education and the Ontario Teachers Federation.  The plan 
is an independent corporation, with a board of directors appointed jointly by the Ontario Ministry 
of Education and Ontario Teachers Federation.   
Benefits are 2% per year of service multiplied by final (five year) average salary.  The 
benefit is integrated with the Canada Pension Plan (CPP – Canadian social insurance).  Benefits 
are fully inflation indexed, and are payable to members and survivors as life annuities.  Only 
accrued benefits are protected (the plan may change the plan formula for future service). 
Teachers and the government of Ontario (with small amounts from other employers) each 
fund half the cost of the plan (in 2007 teachers paid $CN 1,040 million, the Ontario government 
$CN 1,060 million and other employers/transfers from other plans $CN 38 million).  For 2009, 
employee contributions are 10.4% up to the Canadian Pension Plan (CPP) Maximum 
Pensionable Earnings limit ($CN 46,300) and 12.0% over the CPP limit; employer contributions 
are equal to employee contributions (OTPP 2008).   
The OTPP is an independent corporation.  It is managed by a Board with members 
nominated equally by the Ontario Teachers’ Federation (OTF) and the Ontario Ministry of 
Education.  They jointly set benefit levels, contribution rates for teachers (which are matched by 
the government and other employers) and how any shortfalls or surpluses are addressed. Board 
members are retirement professionals appointed by the OTF and Ministry of Education (the OTF 
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may appoint one teacher).  Each group appoints four board members, and the board members 
jointly appoint their own chair.   
The plan was recently updated to modify the inflation index to make 50% of the inflation 
increase conditional on fund performance, longevity improvements and other factors.  In any 
year where the full inflation increase is not provided, the government and other employers will 
contribute the amount foregone as an additional contribution (to maintain the 50/50 cost sharing 
in the plan).   
Dutch industry wide plans.  Plans are typically collective funds, organized either by 
occupation or industry.  They are designed to be self-sustaining.  All employees are expected to 
join a fund, and all workers should have access to a fund.  Almost all industries or occupations 
have these plans; there are a few private DB plans left but most individuals participate in these 
funds6.  
Benefits are typically career pay with accruals of 2% per year or higher, and are generally 
integrated with social insurance.  A fixed benefit, generally the career pay benefit without 
indexation, is guaranteed. Indexation on the career pay benefits is made conditional to 
performance of the fund.  The fund can “make up” past foregone indexation if superior funding 
levels achieved.    For example, the plan may provide no indexation for a funding level below 
85%, partial indexation for funding levels between 85 and 10%, full indexation for funding 
levels at 105% and above and backlog indexation starts at funding levels of 125% (From Policy 
Ladder Example, Box 4.1, Kakes and Broeders 2006).   
Post-retirement indexation is also conditional on performance of the funds.  Plans 
generally use the same or similar policy assumptions as for pre-retirement indexation. 
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Contributions also typically vary based on the targeted funding level; if the fund falls 
below that level contributions are increased gradually; at higher levels contributions are reduced.  
Certain boundaries are defined by law (e.g. employers and participants must pay actuarial 
premium if funding level is at or below 140%). 
Pension funds are generally invested in equities but measurements are at market rates.  
Typical fund mix might be 50% equities, 50% bonds (Ponds and van Riel 2007) 
UMC Plan.  The Clergy Retirement Security Program of the United Methodist Church 
(UMC Plan) is a church-sponsored plan.  It has both a DB and DC component; we will only 
cover the DB component.  Clergy have access to Social Security benefits (unless they decide, as 
individuals, to opt out).   
The UMC General Board of Pensions makes investment decisions, sets contribution 
levels and makes recommendations to the convention.  Most of the Board is elected from the 
general membership but a few positions are appointed based on expertise.  There are additional 
ad-hoc members, appointed for the expertise, who serve on Board committees.   
Participation is mandatory for all regional conferences (regional groupings of local 
churches, roughly akin to states; there are 63).  Regional conferences do not control benefit 
design, investment policy, or aggregate contribution levels.  Plan changes can only be made at 
convention by an elected committee of 1,000 delegates that meets for two weeks once every four 
years.  By definition, half of the delegates are clergy. That committee makes all decisions that 
are made on behalf of the worldwide and/or national church. 
Benefits are 1.25% times final denominational average compensation for each year of 
service.  Joint and survivor benefits are fully subsidized.  Subsidized early retirement is available 
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after 40 years of service.  Benefits are inflation indexed post-retirement. There is a maximum 
retirement age of 72.  Lump sums are not available.   
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Endnotes
                                                 
1 In general, participants preferred whatever type of plan they had.  When asked which type of plan they 
preferred (DB or DC) a majority of workers with a DC plan said they prefer a DC plan (62%) while a majority of 
workers with a DB plan said they preferred a DB plan (51%); workers who were offered both types of plan were 
split between their preference for DC (41%) and DB (37%). However, the preference for a DB plan was strongly 
influenced by preferences of government workers (64% of government workers prefer a DB plan; of non-
government workers with a DB plan, 44% prefer a DB plan and 39% prefer a DC plan).  As age increases, 
preferences for a DB plan increased sharply (40% of workers age 50 or older expressed a preference for a DB plan, 
versus 31% of workers age 40-49 and 20% of workers younger than age 40).  Within the survey, only a small 
percentage of workers (13%) expressed no preference for DB or DC.   
2 Cohort mortality risk is defined as the risk that mortality will improve (decline) or worsen (increase) for 
an entire generation.  This risk cannot be hedged by pooling; pooling can only hedge the risk that an individual’s 
mortality experience will be different from the average expected mortality experience.  
3 The TIAA plan is a variable annuity plan.  Corporate single-employer sponsored plans can currently offer 
this variable annuity design; it does not have be done through a third party, although it works well for a third party 
because contributions are fixed.  
4 The goal of Retirement 20/20 is to look for models that evolve beyond the traditional employer sponsored 
DB/DC system.  The initiative has focused on studying models that are outside that system; this does not imply that 
there are not strong examples of employer sponsored DB or DC plans.  
5 Accrued benefits are measured both with future inflation indexation (pre-and post-retirement) and without 
future indexation.  The different measures are used for different purposes in the policy ladder.  
6 Plans may be organized by single employers; in 2005 14.5% of active participants were in company 
pension plans, compared to 84.8% in industry-wide plans (Ponds and van Riel 2007). 
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Table I – Society 
Measurement Framework Criteria 
Criteria Definition 
Adequate Protects vulnerable citizens. 
Affordable  Does not take resources from other social needs. Ensures risk pooling done efficiently.  
Sustainable Sustainable across and within generations.  Equitable across and within generations. 
Robust Fair, covers great  majority, creates shared economic growth, avoids adverse incentives 
Does not promote 
economic risk  
Efficiently allocates resources and encourages labor force participation. 
Does not promote 
political risk 
Promotes fiscal/political integrity and political stability. 
Does not lead to system 
failure 
Withstands shocks, not prone to instability or adverse incentives. 
Addresses imperfections 
of other stakeholders 
Promotes strong individual decision making and covers lack of market instruments.  
Promote social solidarity 
and integrity 
Ensures basic standards of living; ensures risks are shared. 
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Table II – Individuals 
Measurement Framework Criteria 
Criteria Definition 
Guaranteed income Provides substantial level of income protection.  
Predictability of income  Facilitates retirement planning. 
Retirement flexibility Allows choice of retirement age, including possibility to phase into retirement. 
Portability Minimizes loss upon employment termination. 
Sensitive to employment 
conditions 
Benefits may vary in line with employment conditions. 
Sensitive to family needs Benefits may vary in line with spousal and children needs. 
Requirement for individual 
skills 
Level of knowledge required to plan for retirement. 
Investment risk  Protects against fluctuations in market returns. 
Longevity risk Protects against possibility to outlive assets. 
Inflation risk Includes both pre and post retirement inflation. 
Premature retirement risk Protects against forced early retirement due to disability, family circumstances, and involuntary 
termination. 
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Table III – Employers 
Measurement Framework Criteria 
Criteria Definition 
Supports primary business 
purpose 
Enhances core purpose of the employer’s business. 
Workforce management: 
attraction & retention  
Enhances business value by allowing attraction and retention of the “right employees”. 
Workforce management: 
transition of employees 
Enhances business value by facilitating the orderly transition of employees. 
Responsive to owners Responds to needs of owners, e.g., shareholders for public companies, which may limit amount of risk 
to be taken. 
Business risk Ability to react quickly to changes in the competitive landscape.  
Regulatory risk Allows plan to be operated to fit needs and change to meet conditions easily within regulatory 
framework. 
Fiduciary risk Allows plan to be easily operated to minimize fiduciary liability. 
Litigation risk Allows management of workforce to avoid lawsuits. 
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Table IV – Markets  
Measurement Framework Criteria 
Criteria Definition 
Maximizes use of markets  Effectively uses markets and hedging mechanisms; stakeholders can purchase hedging instruments 
cost effectively. 
Transparent (cost) Costs of plan are transparent (fees, costs to sponsors, other stakeholders, etc).   
Strong Governance Fiduciary roles of plan sponsors well defined.  Plan structure minimizes agency issues, particularly 
regarding plan investment and risk taking. 
Efficiently priced Market price is well understood and accepted by stakeholders.  Plan does not contain features which 
cannot be efficiently priced. 
Plans incorporate discipline in pricing.  
Efficient risk bearing Plan efficiently pools idiosyncratic risks and hedges systematic risks (both economic and 
demographic). 
Allocation of risk  Plan efficiently allocates risk across stakeholders, giving each stakeholder the risk he can best bear. 
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Figure I  
Sample Measurement Framework Page, Individual criteria, DB framework 
 
Traditional Final Pay DB Plan (single employer, corporate sponsored) 
Individual’s Needs & Risks (Composite Rating  (Yellow-green)) 
Criteria Objective Rating Evaluation Effect of adverse incentives 
Guaranteed 
income 
Provides substantial 
level of income 
protection.  
 
 Benefit promise is well defined and 
based on final pay (income security).  
For short service employees, benefits 
are often quite small and not related 
to final pay at retirement.  
If plan terminates not fully funded, 
individuals close to or even in 
retirement can lose some benefits; 
presence of a government guaranty 
program could encourage employers 
to cease funding in financial distress 
situations.  (Red) 
Predictability 
of income  
Facilitates retirement 
planning. 
 Fixed promise allows for retirement 
planning.   
If plan terminates not fully funded, 
participants can lose some benefits; 
existence of a government guaranty 
program can offset some risk but may 
encourage employers in financial 
distress to underfund plan.  (Red) 
Retirement 
flexibility 
Allows choice of 
retirement age, 
including possibility to 
phase into retirement. 
 Ability to choose retirement age, but 
individuals may not understand how 
promise changes with retirement age; 
may not be able to phase into 
retirement with partial benefits.   
Early retirement reductions, while 
actuarially sound, are not easy to 
understand and can be perceived as 
unfair by employees, causing them to 
devalue the plan.  (Red-Yellow) 
Portability Minimizes loss upon 
employment 
termination. 
 Final pay formula creates very small 
benefits for those who leave pre-
retirement.  
Lump sums can further expose 
leakage issues encouraging people to 
spend what seem to be small lump 
sums on non-retirement needs.  
(Red-Yellow) 
 
Source (SOA 2009a, forthcoming) (modified for black and white reproduction). 
Yellow 
Green 
Yellow
-Green 
Red-
Yellow 
   
45
Figure II  
Sample Measurement Framework Page, Individual criteria, DC framework 
 
Traditional DC Plan (corporate sponsor, single employer)  
Individual’s Needs & Risks (Composite rating:  (Yellow) ) 
Criteria Objective Rating Evaluation Effect of adverse incentives 
Guaranteed 
income 
Provides substantial 
level of income 
protection.  
 
 Cumbersome and expensive for 
individuals to convert account 
balances to guaranteed income; 
conversion can also have negative 
tax consequences 
Individuals may be sold products that 
provide unneeded features, or that do 
not provide true longevity guarantee. 
Cost of conversion at an individual 
rather than group rate harmful for less 
wealthy individuals with small account 
balances.  (Red-yellow) 
Predictability 
of income  
Facilitates retirement 
planning. 
 Works better for wealthier rather than 
less wealthy individuals (who can 
afford professional advice).  Difficult 
to manage and understand value of 
account balance, particularly small 
balances. 
Moral hazard not significant.  (Red-
yellow) 
Retirement 
flexibility 
Allows choice of 
retirement age, 
including possibility to 
phase into retirement. 
 Unrestricted ability to choose 
retirement age. 
No protection for individuals who find 
they might have to retire early due to 
disability or other impairment.  
(Yellow) 
Portability Minimizes loss upon 
employment 
termination. 
 Perfect portability Leakage is common, as participants 
take small account balances in cash 
on termination.  (Yellow) 
 
 
Source (SOA 2009a, forthcoming) (modified for black and white reproduction).  
Yellow 
Red-
Yellow 
Green 
Green 
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Figure III 
Summary chart for Society stakeholder, Traditional DB Plan  
 
 
 
 
Society 
(composite 
rating) 
Meets society’s needs 
and risks. 
 Individual criteria ratings:  
         
Plans protect long-service workers 
well (less so short-service workers) 
avoiding the need for more 
government sponsored benefits. 
Adjusted composite rating:  
Ratings after adverse incentives:  
         
System depends on employer 
paternalism, and employer adverse 
incentives require government 
regulation, which destabilizes system. 
 
Source (SOA 2009a, forthcoming) (modified for black and white reproduction).  
 
 
(1) The color line shows ratings in green/yellow-green/yellow/red-yellow/red order.  In this color line, there are two green, four yellow-green, two 
yellow and one red rating. 
 
(2) The adjusted composite rating is yellow.  The color line shows the adjusted ratings in green/yellow-green/yellow/red-yellow/red order.  In this 
color line, there are three yellow-green, two yellow, three red-yellow and one red rating. 
The average rating of 
yellow-green is a 
composite of the nine 
society subcategories. 
The ratings for the nine-subcategories 
are shown in the color line.  They are 
color grouped so you can see how 
many of each rating were received. (1) 
Ratings for each subcategory were adjusted 
for the effects of adverse incentives.  This 
shows the new color line after adverse 
incentives are considered as well as a new 
composite rating. (2) 
Yellow
